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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMER'S AND MERCHANT'S 
BANI{:, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNI,7ERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case Noc 
8282 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant engages in the bu.siness of financing the 
operation of automobile dealers in all 48 states and the 
District of Columbia. This operation encompasses two 
forms of financing: 
1. WHOLESALE: Ap·pellant pays the auto man-
ufacturers for the dealers' new cars upon trust 
rec~ipt financing or floor planning. Some of 
these vehicles are, of course, used as dealer 
demonstrators. Also, used cars may be floor 
planned by the dealer. In all three recited 
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instances when the dealer sells the car or 
changes it from "floor plan" to "dealer demon-
strator " he sends a check to Appellant to 
' . pay off the outstanding b:alance on that car., 
He may then issue a sight draft on Appellant 
for a slightly reduced,price, which sum dealer 
receives. This, in effect, constitutes a refinanC-
ing, but still on a wholesale plane. 
2. RET .AIL: The car dealer s·ells an automobile 
to one of his cmtomers. If the customer de-
sires financing, he executes a conditional sales 
contract to Appell~nt. The car dealer then 
sends the contract to Appellant in a sight draft 
envelop·e drawing on Appellant for the amount 
of the contract enclosed. Also, the car deal·er 
encloses his own check in the envelope to pay 
the amount due Appellant on the "wholesale 
floor plan" transaction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence is uncontroverted that commencing in 
October, 1952, .AppeHant commenced to finance the opera-
tion of Harry Parsley, Inc., a Lincoln-Mercury dealer in 
Provo, Utah~ 
Respondent was Parsley's bank. 
The evidence is not controverted that Respondent 
bank was authorized to treat as cash sight drafts drawn 
upon Appellant by p·arsley. 
It should he clearly understood at this point . that 
Resp·ondent has never denied giving this authority and 
it .has never made claim that such arrangen1ent n1ust be 
in 'vriting. It has acknowledged and does acknowledge 
that this arr~ngement continued until December 24, 1952. 
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From this point, there is conflict in the testim'Ony. 
But the principal conflict, as Appellant will point out in 
its subsequent sections, is in the testimony of Respon-
dent's main witness, J. Hamilton Calder. 
On December 24, 1952, the Salt Lake Manager of 
Appellant instructed Respondent that sight drafts drawn 
by Parsley for wholesale financing were no longer to be 
treated as cash. Respondent acknowledged said termi-
nation of authority, and assured Appellant that its in-
structions would be followed. 
On January 6, 1953, Appellant instructed R€spon-
dent that sight drafts drawn by Parsley were not to be 
treated as cash, regardless of whether they were for 
wholesale or retail transactions. The evidence is that 
there is no denial of said instruction nor of agreement 
to abide thereby. 
The conflict being that all drafts that were honored 
as ·cash after December 24, 1952, were for wholesale items, 
as Appellant claims, and were for retail items, as Re;... 
spondent claims. 
From January 5th to January 6th, 1953, sight drafts 
were drawn on Appellant by Parsley and treated as cash 
by Respondent for a total sum of $29;233.65. 
Said sight drafts totaled thirteen in number. 
Appellant stopped payment on said drafts. 
At said time, Parsley had a cash balance of $7;802.57 
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on deposit with Respondent, which sum Respondent off-
setag_ainst said $29,233.65, leaving it a claim of $21,4-31.08. 
The evidence is not controverted that on January 
12, 19·5.3,. Respondent took a note from Parsley for 
$21,000.00, secured by a mortgage upon all of Parsley's 
inventory of p·arts and accounts receivable. There has 
never been a release of this mortgage, and to the date of 
trial, Resp·ondent admits to havj_ng collected and to re-
taining the total sum of $3,554.29 upon said mortgaged 
accounts recei va:ble. 
Parsley, Inc. was subsequently put into involuntary 
bankruptcy upon the petition of Appellant, The State 
Tax Comn1ission of Utah, and of others. 
Respondent filed suit in the lower court, claiming 
the sum of $21,431.08 from Appellant. On June 26, 1954, 
Ap.pellant demanded that· the matter be tried by Jury, at 
which time the Jury fee of $5.00 was paid. 
Again on July 21, 1954, Appellant made demand for 
trial by Jury. These demands were refused by the trial 
cou.rt, an:d non-jury trial was commenced on the 4th day 
of August, 1954. 
It is from the trial·court's Judgment for the sum of 
$17,876.81 to Respondent that this appeal is taken. Said 
sum was computed by the allowance to Appellant of 
$3,554 .. 27, which was the amount collected and retained 
by Resp·ondent from the accounts receivable Inortgaged 
to it by Parsley. 
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POINT I. 
TH·E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING T-0 GRANT 
APPELLANT A TRIAL BY JURY: 
Authority need not be cited to show the court that 
there is a right to trial by Jury in civil cases, not wholly 
equitable- in nature. 
Our rules of civil procedure clearly specify that one 
demanding. a Jury trial of a civil matter may have it, 
provided that timely demand therefor be made und-er 
rules of local practice. 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, the 
local rule is that Jury demand must be made at the time 
the case is set for trial. 
The hearing for trial date in this case was held on 
May 7, 1954. ·On said date, the case was -scheduled for 
trial on July 26, 1954. 
On June 26, 1954, Appellant made formal demand 
for Jury trial and paid the required $5.00 fee. The 
demand was refused. 
On July 21, 1954, Appellant, in open court, again 
Inade demand for trial by Jury. It was again refuse<L 
Trial of the case was not started until August 4, 1954, 
at which time counsel for Appellant deemed it improvid-
ent to again request a Jury trial, in the light of two pre-
vious refusals. 
Ap,pellant sub1nits to this Court that a demand Inade 
thirty eight days before trial and again thirteen days 
before trial is a resonable demand, and one that complies 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the loose requirement that demand Inust be made 
upon trial setting - it was announced that the trial date 
would probably be postponed at the time of the trial 
court's last refusal. 
Further, if such local rule is deemed not complied 
with, then said rule is unreasonable. 
The action in refusing Appellant a trial of the issues 
in this case by Jury was unreasonable and capricious and 
is grounds for reversal. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTRACTS HEREIN SUED UPO·N ARE WHOLE~ 
SALE CONTRACTS: 
In this section, it is .important that it be clearly 
understood that the subject of this controversy is thir-
te.en sight drafts, together with their contents, the con-
tents being a delineation of whether the business trans-
action represented 'by the drafts were retail or whole-
sale. For ease of reference, they will be listed: 
Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 
No. 
A 
B, 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
Date of Draft Customer Name Amount 
.January 5, 1953-Crandall B. Dunn ........ --------~$ 2,497.48 
January 5, 1953-Kenneth L. Herrington__________ 2,539.49 
January 6, 1953-Arvil S. Conk____________________________ 2~682.50 
January 6, 1953-John DeWain Smith................ 2,466.79 
January 6, 1953-.. Don Bush ore ·------·-----·-----------· 2,557.84 
January 5, 1953-Harry ParsleY;· Inc................. 2,693.95 
January 5, 1953-· Harry Parsley, Inc................. 2,509.57 
January 5, 1953-Harry Parsley, Inc................. 3,738.95 
January 5, 1953-Harry Parsley, Inc................. 3,982.81 
$25,669.38 
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The above items are, in fact, wholsale items, as will 
be shown by Appellant in this section by reference to the 
trial record. 
In addition, the following drafts presented during 
the same period of time become important, as will be 
pointed out, as they -are, in fact, retail ite~, and Re-
spondents were free to treat them as cash: 
1. January 5, 1953-LaMar Wilde ----------------------------$ 990.77 
2. January 5, 1953-Darrell North -------------------------- 718.90 
3. January 6, 1953-Dale Peterson -------------------------- 204.60 
4. January 6, 1953-Winafred A. Jones____________________ 1,640.00 
$3,554.27 
It will readily be seen that the total of the above two 
amounts constitutes the amount of Respondent's claim, 
less the cash from the Parsley account Respondent ap-
propriated to its own cre'dit. 
The record clearly shows, without contradiction, that 
the former items, plaintiff's .Exhibits A through I, in-
clusive, are, in fact, wholesale transactions. 
See R. 249. There is no conflict in the testimony 
whatever as to that precept. 
Nor is there a conflict that the second series of drafts 
referred to were for retail transactions. See R-250, lines 
14 to 20. 
The contention of Respondent that it received a 
peculiar definition of_ "wholesale" will be discussed in a 
subsequent section of this brief. To this point, however, 
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it is abundantly clear that said .drafts were wholesale, 
established by uncontroverted testimony. Also, if ·the 
court would cursorily examine the :contents of plaintjff's 
Exhibits A through I, inclusive, there would be no doubt 
that anyone woul1d conclude they were wholesale .trans-
actions, or, at the very least, ·an examination would create 
a duty of inquiry as to their nature. 
Also, at.this point, it is important that it be clearly 
understood that the sight drafts totaling $3,554;27, listed 
above, were given to Parsley_ Inc. by R-espond~nt (R-102, 
lines 8 to 19, inclusive; R-173 line 28 to R-174), and were 
so given against the wishes and advice of Appellant (R-
1~1, line 12 to R-102, line 5·; R-22, lines 1 to 16) e 
It isn't denied that the return of these drafts to 
Parsley was the consideration given by Resp<?·ndoot to 
Parsley in return for the note an~ mortgage executed in 
favor of Respondent for $21,000.00. See the Judgment 
of the trial court read from th~ bench on, the conclusion of 
the trial. Also, see R-22, lines 17 to 28. 
The foregoing makes it crystal clear that the first 
nine drafts referred to, Plaintiff's Exhibits_ A through 
I, were, i~ fact, ·wholesale drafts, disregarding for a 
moment Respondent's peculiar claim of what is whole-
sale. 
It is equally clear that the remaining four drafts 
were for retail transactions. 
These four retail transactions were later paid for, 
in full, by Appellant. See R-228, Lines 18 through 30; 
R.:229, lines 1 to 13. 
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Thus it is seen that the trial court permitted Re-
spondent to be paid for these four retail drafts twice. 
·That the trial court, by its Judgment, is compelling Ap-
pellant to pay s:aid draf~s twice. Instead of paying 
$3,554.27 for same, therefor, Appellant is made to pay 
$7,108.54. 
To further point up the injustice of the result, 
Respondent relinquished these drafts to Parsley against 
the positive recommendation and desire of Appellant, 
who is now asked -to pay Respondent for ·doing what it 
was instructed not to do. See R-101, line 12 to R-102, 
line 5. 
It is urged ~as elemental that the trial court com-
mitte'd error in not awarding Defendant-Appell-ant an 
off-s-et against Plaintiff-Respondent for the sum of 
$3,554.7, represented by property the Respondent took 
to the full exclusion of Appellant, and for which Appel-
lant subsequently paid Parsley said full sum. 
Because Appellant urges an off-set here is not to 
be considered to the slightest degree to be an acqui-
escence of validity of the remaining portion of the trial 
court's ruling. 
POINT III. 
THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF INSTRUCTIONS AS 
TO DETERMINATION OF "WHOLESALE" IS INCREDIBLE 
AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE: 
The trial court, in reaching its ruling against Appel-
lant, found that when Appellant_ instructed Respondent' 
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not to honor sight drafts as eash on items of ''whole-
sale" financing, that Appellant defined wholesale to 
mean any sight drafts for figures in even amounts of 
$3,000.00, $4,000.00, $5,000.00, $6,000.00, and additional 
$1,000.00 figures. 
The argument under all of the circumstances, is in-
credible; but the ·finding that such was done is breath-
taking. 
In this situation we are not dealing with children 
nor with uninformed laity. 
J. Hamilton Calder, Respondent's cashier, who claims 
that he received such instructions has great and varied 
financial background and experience: 
1. Mr. Calder graduated from a local university 
(R-129). 
2. Mr. C·alder majored in Business Administration 
at Stanford University (R-129-130). 
3. Mr. Calder had four years experience in appli-
cance financing (R-86, lines 8 to 22). 
4. Mr. Calder has been wOTking in a bank for eigh-
teen years :(R-86, lines 24 to 29), and 
5. Was Cashier of the Bank, Respondent, at th~ 
time the transactions herein involved took place, 
and is now a Vice-President (R-86-87). 
The background of !Ir. Nichols, the employee of 
Appellant, the person who is claimed to bave given sue) 
a novel definition of "wholesale" is: 
1. Eighteen years in the finaneing business (R-212, 
lines 18 to 25 )·. 
10 
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There we have the background of these principals 
involved in a discussion of:/ what is "wholesale": Appel-
lant's employee with eighteen y¢ars experience in financ-
ing; Respondent's employee with twenty-two years in 
financing with an e'ducation in business administration 
from 'Stanford University. 
Now then, on December 24th, 1952, Mr. Calder, 
Respondent's Cashier, testifies tha_t Mr. Nichols told him 
that Respondent was no longer to treat as cash sight 
drafts for "wholesa~e" financing, and that Mr. Nichols 
defined wholesale as being "even amounts" of $3,000.00 
, or over, R-14, line 16 to R-16, line 7, where Mr. Calder 
testified: 
'' . . . Mr. Nichols was explicit in stating that we 
were not to accept drafts on wholesal~ financing." 
Now then, bearing this purported definition--.-even 
amounts-in mind, let's examine the record -as to expert 
testimony as to whether or not it is possible to tell the , 
character-retail or wholesale--of a transaction repre-
sented by a sight draft by reference to the face of the 
sight draft : 
A. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WITNESSES: 
1. J. Hamilton Calder, Vice-Pre-sident and Cashier: 
''I askd him how to determine whether a draft 
"\Vas wholesale or retail and the reason I asked the 
question is the drafts didn't reveal on its face 
anything as to its character.'' R. 14, lines 25 to 
28. Also see R. 169, lines 17 to 20. 
11 
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2. Victor J. Bir·d-Vice~President, R. 171, who has 
twenty-five years experience in ihe ibanking business, 
R. 203, lines 21, 22. 
'' Q. I am asking you personally from the 
face of a draft whether you can tell whether it is 
wh·olesale or retail1 
~'A. If I didn't kno'v the individual I would 
not know whether it was wholesale or retail. 
'' Q. By looking at the face. of the draft f 
''A. I would not. 
"Q. It is. impossible to tell, is it not f 
''A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. And you say it. is impossible f 
''A. Y·es sir.''· R. 204, lines 9 to 18. 
Aside . from an accountant who testified to other 
matters, these are the only hvo ·witnes·ses produced by 
R-espondent. 
B. DEFENDANT-APPELLAN~ WITNESSES: 
1. Francis J. Nichols-Appellant's employee, with 
eighteen years finance expe_rience, R. 212, lines 18 to 
25, testified that it is impossible to t.ell the nature of a 
transaction by looking at the face of a sight draft, R. 213, 
an~d 'in res·ponse to the question.: 
- '' Q. Any set formula in the financing busi-
ness wher.e. figures are going to be odd or even f '' 
he testified: 
"A. No.'' 
12 
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2. Clyde B. Sperry-Appellant's Branch Manager, 
R. 225, with about eight years credit business experience, 
R. 229, lines 12-13. 
At R. 229, lines 27 to 30, 'he testified: 
''A. It would be· impossible to determine 
from the face of that sight draft what it contained. 
''Q. From any sight draft~ 
''A. From any sight draft.'' 
3. Woodrow A. Wilkinson-Then Operations Man-
ager for Appe.llant, R. 245, lines 9 to 14, and now Vice-
President of Valley State Bank, Salt Lake City, R. 245, 
line·s five to eight, having ten years finance business 
experience, R. 250, lines 22-23. 
At R. 250, line 28 toR. 251, line 7, this will be found: 
'' Q. Based on your experience in the financ-
ing business, I would like you to tell me whether 
or not you have an opinion as to whether it is 
possible to distinguish between wholesale and 
retail transactions by mere reference to the face 
of a sight ,draft~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. Do you have an opinion~ 
' 'A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. What is your opinion~ 
"A. It is absolutely impossible." 
4. G. R. 1\fcElhany-Appellant's Vice-President, R. 
256, with n1ore than eighteen years finance business 
experience, R. 266, line 27, who testified at R. 267 that 
such differentiation between ''wholesale-retail'' can not 
be made by reference to the face of a sight draft. 
13 
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The foregoing should make it abundantly clear to the 
Court and beyond equivocation THAT IT IS IMPOS-
SIBLE TO TELL WHETHER A TRANSA·CTI9N. 
REPRESENTED BY A SIGHT DR~FT IS OF A 
WHOLESALE OR RETAIL NATURE BY REFER .. 
ENCE TO THE FACE· OF THE DRAFT. 
Now th·en, Re'Spondent tells tlie trial. -court that their 
cashier with twenty-two year's conim.ercial experience 
received such instructions from an empldyee of Appel-
lant with eight~·en years commercial experience. 
It is submitted that such statement should shock 
the minds of reasonable men. What is even worse,. Mr. 
Calder claims relUrnce on it. 
The whole thing ;becomes. ludicrous by comparative 
analysis, assuming for this purpose that Mr. Nichols 
made such definition to Mr. Calder. Let's look at 
~nalogies·: 
1. Attorney A tells Attorney B, each with 
eighteen and twenty:.. two -y~ars experience, respec-
tively, in response- to a. request for advice : 
'' Settle the matt·er with him, bu,t don't 
commit a tort." 
Attorney B says: "What's a tort?" 
Attorney A relates: ''A tort is where you 
punch him in the nose.'' 
Attorney B then m·akes ·a swing to th·e solar 
plexis ·of his adversary ·and claims no tort .Irecause 
that wasn't the definition given him of a tort. 
14 
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2. P-atient tells the doctor to take out his 
tonsils. The doctor asks where they are and is told 
they are in the belly. The doctor takes -out the 
appendix and says: "Golly, that's what my 
patient. told me.'' 
Most certainly, ·even if the Bank Cashier was told 
that a wholesale transaction could be detected from the 
face of a check, whi~h is a ridiculous conclusion, then 
he, as a banker with technical training and vast experi-
ence, knew better than to rely on it And one 'step further 
-had no right to rely on it, but had a positive duty to 
do otherwise. 
No discussion is needed to inform anyone what ·lp.ust 
be done to differentiate. You must open the envelopes. 
At R. 169, lines 13 to 19, Mr. Calder testified that 
except for the definition given him he would have to open 
the envelopes. 
At R. 135, Mr .. Calder testified that no one told ~im 
not to open the draft envelopes. 
At R. 210, lines 12 to 23, Mr. Nichols, Appellant's 
employee, te·stified he told Calder he would have to open 
the envelopes to differentiate. 
It is submitted that the Respondent bank certainly 
had no duty to take such a responsibility of differentia-
tion. But it did accept it and thus it ·created for itself a 
stringent duty of care. The bank placed itself in a 
position of peril and then wholly disregarded that peril. 
It dan1aged itself. 
15 
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At· this point, Appellant wishes to refer to Defend-
ant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 4, l'abled: "Memorandum 
from Hamilton Calder,'' dated January 24, 1953. This 
is. a :vesume' of ~he whole transaction written by the bank, 
Respondent, to its ~ttorney, J. Rulon Morgan, R. 115 and 
R. 116, lines 19 to 21, and admitted to be verbatim, except 
as to change~ made on it by· Calder and initialed by him 
( R. 150 to 152). 
It is sub;mitted that_ the attempts at equivocaiion 
and evasion of this exhibit's impact are re·adily apparent 
at R. 115 and R. 116, and R. 149 to 151. 
In any ev.ent, the court's attention is called to the 
third parag:raph ,of the memorandum, wherein the 
critical conversation of December 24th between Mr. 
Calder .and Mr. Nich{)ls is related, it reads-: 
''On December 24th ·:Mr~ Nichols called lo!J.g 
distance an·d inf•ormed us .. we were not to aooept 
any 'more drafts from Parsley ·On used car floor-
ing, OR ANY OTHER WHOLESALE FINANC-
ING· .. I assured him we would accept no further 
sight drafts for credit on WH·OLE:SALING UN-
LESS AUTHORIZED BY HIM, but would con-
tinue to give immediate credit on retail drafts." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
At R. 82, further evidence. of ~quivocation and a 
patent change of story in Calder's testimony is found. 
As pertains to the December· 24th conversation: 
"Q. Didn't he {Nichols) elaborate on whole-
sale financing at all! 
· · ''A. I didn't go in to the detail. He didn't 
say anything about any wholesale financing 
16 
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exoopt on us·ed ~ars. That is the only thing he 
mentioned. 
" * 
"* 
''A. The used cars were the problem.'.' 
Also, commencing at R. 82, line 29, we find truthful 
testimony for the first time concerning that ·conversa"" 
tion. Testimony that ·exactly coincides with the written 
resume to his attorney: 
'' Q. Any discussion how you could tell the 
difference between a used car and a new car? 
''A. My comment on the statetnent wa:s as to 
whether it was solely used car financing.. The 
conve·rsation was in ·regards to used ear financing 
and used· car financing was the proble~. He did 
relate that there would be no wholesale financing 
of any nature BUT THERE WAS NO ;COM-
MENT AS TO WHAT THEY, AT THAT TIME, 
CONSIDERED WHOLESALE FINANCING 
WOULD BE·.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
The memorandum contains no reference to eyen 
amounts of $3,000.00 or more. The abov.e testimony states 
no comment on what wholesale financing would be. 
So, Calder - ,''assured him we would accept n.o 
further sight drafts for credit on wholesaling unless 
authorized by him ... '' 
There is the problem and there. is the law suit finely 
condensed: 
1. No more wholesale drafts acceptable. 
2. Bank agrees. 
17 
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3. Bank negligently pays wholesale. 
4. Bank sues another to recoup a loss caused 
by its own, :lnattention to its .own affairs~ 
Another thing, what, did the Bank know of the 
financial affairs of ·H~rry Parsley, Inc.~: 
A. It knew Parsley "kited" checks. See R. 
96, line 22· to R. 98, line 27. The bank knew that 
Parsley, on De-cember· 20th, 1954, was $17,000.00 
short, and that the $17,000.00 was ~ade up not. 
from his own funds, but: ''·With. funds from ]ri.s 
routine ;operation ''R-98, line 27. The Bank, 
knowing that ·Appellant .was financing Parsley 
for .. m'ore than $350,000.00 during a three month 
period by .use of sight drafts drawn on Appellant, 
R. 10, line·~ 12 to 30, was under a duty to inform 
Appellant of ~ 'ch~k~kiting,'' whieh it did nat do, 
R. 100,. lines 15 to 21. 
B. It knew that Parsley's financial condition 
was bad, as ·witness Calder's testimony commenc-
ing at R. 195, ~bearing in mind the $17,000~00 check 
kite on Dec~mber 20th, 1952: 
'' Q. Would you look at the entry here for 
December 24, 1952, (Defendant-Appellanf;s ~x­
hibit No. 1) and tell me what. Harry Parsley,. Inc. 
balance was on that date a'S. shown by the records Y 
(Monthly Bank statements to Parsley) 
"A. Three Cents $.03. 
'' Q. Three C'en ts Y 
"A. Yes siTe 
'' Q. Did you inf·orm !fr. Nichols of that 
balance? 
''A. He didn't ask me.'' 
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Can you imagine - a $17,000.00 cheek kite -
$35~,000.00 wor:th of Appellant's finance money in three 
months-. a THREE CENT balance-and Respondent's 
cashier says : ''he didn't ask me.'' This- in· the ~ace of 
Nichols telling Calder that Parsley's statement showed 
a $90,000.00 operating profit, R. 10, lines 1 to 10. Refer 
to R. 13~ for testimony of . other ridiculously small 
balances. 
Further, if the ·court will refer to Defendant-Appel-
lant's Exhibit No. 1 it will see that there were -continued 
small daily balances-all well within the 1bank's knowl-
edge and comprehension, but 'beyond the knowledge of 
Appellant. Also, refer to Defendant-App~llant's Exhibit 
No .. 2, a recap showing almost continuous overdrafts in 
large amounts. 
Coold-it ·be that Respondent's cashier had any inter-
est in ke.eping Parsley in business with Appellant's 
funds~ Could it be that he had such an interest that 
Appellant was not informed of ,these matters~-
More cross examination of . Calder, R. 121 : 
'' Q. What "ras th·e addres·s of Mr. Parsley's 
business~ 
. ''A. North on 5th W esto 
'' Q. You owned the Building didn't you¥ 
''A. N'O sir. 
'~>Q. Who did~ 
''A. I had an interest in the ·building a 
"Q. }I ow much of an interest 1 
''A. Half interest. '' 
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Appellant re·spect(ully urges this· Court that: 
1. Defendant-Appellant's Exhibit -No. 4 
represents a truthful statement of the Decemb_er 
24th conversation. Certainly if there had been 
~uch a novel instruction that yoJI ean tell a whole-
sale transaction from the -face of ·a check, such 
would have· ·been stated in a letter to a litigant's 
attorney. Hind sight is ·a beautiful thing, and 
after all of the facts beca:rhe apparent, what could 
Calder do but drum up a definition that would 
give the bank a fighting chance to recover for its 
·own neglect. Respondent will undoubtedly take 
exception -:to this language, but in th~ face of the 
testimony and the evidence it is felt that all' will 
agree that the minds of reason8Jble men should 
reject the patently/ ''last chance-after thought'' 
story of Respondent's cashier~ 
2. The· Bank undertook a V·ery ·stringent and 
high duty and obligation of care by assenting to 
such agreement of ·differentiation, ·and its duty 
was heightened and increased when it knew of the 
bad ba:rlking practice of Parsley and his poor 
financial con·dition. 
The full weight of the evidehce is against Respond-
ent's clailned definition :of ''wholesale.'' The bank was 
under a duty to .open the envelopes. 
·Technical dis·cussion of what is really wholesale need 
not be entered into. l\{ost ·certainly, a reasonable man, 
a banker 'vith· t'venty-two years experience, A Fortiori, 
'vould, upon looking at the contents of subject draft 
envelopes, have been on guard. Why~: (1) on four of 
the1n there '\Vas a transfer from Parsley to Parsley; (2) 
on all of them, the price was ''invoice''; ( 3) on none of 
20. 
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them was there a charge for state sales tax; (4) on most 
of them the word ''wholesale'' appeared. 
A phone call from ·Calder to Nichols would have pre-
vented the loS"s·e.s herein oo.mplained of as well as this 
law suit. 
One last precept of this relationship and Calder's 
story of '''even amounts '' should effectively sha,tter any 
possibility of belief .. 
Refer to Defendant-A,ppellant's Exhibit No. 5, which 
are ex~act copies of all original deposit slips of I{arry 
Parsley in Respondent bank, ( R. 144, line 23, to R. 145, 
line 1). Each sight draft deposited during this period 
of ,time is therefor individu3rlly listed in Defendant-
Appellant's Exhibit No. 5. (R. 145, lin·e 6 to R. 148, line 
12). 
Plea:se· note that ·during this entire period of time 
there were only two drafts ''over $3,000.00 In even 
$1,000.00 a1nounts. '' 
. The first item; referred to, a $10,000.00 draft, may 
not_ be ·considered and has no part in this law ·suit f.or 
the reason that the· Court ordered testimony us to said 
$10,000.00 item stricken at R. 133 and 134. In any event, 
the draft for ·$10,000.00 wa·s· not presented until January 
5th, 1953, and Mr. Calder couldn't identify the $6,000.00 
item (R. 170). 
The important precept is that from October 1st, 19_52 
through January of 1953, only two items, questionable 
ones, in even amounts were ever deposited by Parsler. 
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T-his makes C-alder's ~statement that he relied on an 
"eve:n amount" definition even more unbelievable. Why? 
Be-caus·e even amounts are a rarity and C.alder knHw 
it and knows it. And he knew there had been a continued 
-cours-e of wlrolesale financing. 
If there re:quiitis -doubt that Calder wouldn't or 
didn't t·estify to what was expedient, cl~iming knowledge 
and truth, let's examine one ~.ore phase .of his testimony 
on direct examination and cornp-ar
1
e it with cross-exami-
nation, concerning Plaintiff-Re'spnndent's Exhibits K, N, 
and R: 
1. Exhibit K: 
Direct Examination: '' Q. I show you, Mr. 
Calder-a· photostatic copy of . . . plaintiff's. ex-
pibit K ... and ask you to. e~amine it and tell us 
whether or not you re<}ognize th·e document~ ''A. 
Y·es sir, I recognize this .as a photostatic copy of 
a qhook ... The amount of the check is $1,779.64 
... ,., (R. 37) 
Cross Exanvination: "Q. All right, Mr. 
Calder, "viii you look at Plaintiff's Exhibit K for 
me and tell me what the amount of the check is 
without referring to any notes that you might 
have~ A. " ... the check is $5,197.64." (R. 107) 
2. Exhibit N: 
Direct Examination: ''~Q. I show you . . . 
"E)Chibit N arid ask if you re~ognize that .. ~'1 ' ' ' 'A. 
Yes -sir, I recogniz.~ this as a photostatic copy of a 
d~ocum·~nt ... in 'th~ amount of $3,598.55~" (R. 41) 
Cross Examin-ation: '' Q. I ask you to look at 
plaintiff's Exhibit N and .tell me the amount of 
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that! "A. It appears to be $2,535.55." (Rc 109, 
110) 
3. Exhibit R: 
Direct Emmination : '' Q-. I show you what 
has been marked ~s- plaintiff's Exhibit Rand ask 
you if your recognize that as a photostatic copy 
of an original check . . . 1 '' ''A. I recognize tha:t 
as a photostat of an o~ginal check in the amount 
of $1,165.00 ..• " (R. 44) 
Cross Examination! "Q. Now I ask you to 
look a.t what has been marked a'S plaintiff's Ex~ 
hibit R, Mr. Calder, and I want you to tell me 
what the -amounlon that one is 7 '' ''A. It ap·pears 
to be $l,OOO.oo~" 
It is respectfully sumitted- that Mr. Calder's · testi-
mony i-s inhe:r;ently unworthy of belief~ It is in6redible. 
It is testimony iborn of hind-sight and expediency, fosfered 
tt> recoup a- loss caused by, -charitably :speaking, rank 
negligence. 
POINT IVo 
THAT ST~TEMENTS OF PROMISE -To HONO·R WHOLE ... 
SALE DRAFTS AF-TER DECEMBER 24TH, 1952, IF MADE, 
ARE UNENFORCEABLE UN.DER THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS: 
To this ·point, Appellant has confined itself to the 
establishment of the facts that: 
1. The drafts in question were, in fact, whole-
sale drafts, and 
2. Respondent agreed that it would not 
handle wholesale drafts after December 24, 1952. 
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Here, Appellant wishes .to :again point .up disparity 
and inconsistency of testimo~y of witnesses for Respond-
ent and to show that no ·subsequent promises were made 
to pay wholesale ·drafts after D·ecember 24t4.. 
The Court's attention is called to Defendant-Appel-
lant's Exhibit No. 4----the memorandum from Calder to 
Respondent's attorney-paragraph 5, which reads: 
"On . January 7th Mr. McConnell an5l Mr. 
Sperry called at the b~nk regarding checks they 
were holding on Harry Parsley, In·corporated. 
They . assured us th_ey wo.uld accept RETAIL 
drafts in the process of clearance, but would pay 
no further drafts signed by Mr. Parsl.ey." (Em-
phasis suppli~·d) 
Now then, compare the above with th·e ''hind-sight-
expedient" te~timony produee:d at the trial by Re~pond·:. 
ent 's Mr. Calder on cross-examination: 
R. 113, line 24 to R. )_14, line 10: 
"Q. Now, on Ja~uary 7th Y<?U h·ad a con-
versation 'vith Mr. McConnell .and Mr. Sperry, 
is that~correct~ · 
' 'A. Yes sir. 
'' Q'! Did you have any conversation with 
them -regarding .sight drafts previously brought 
to you by Harry Parsley that were then in the 
process of clearance~ 
·'~A. Yes.· 
."Q. Did they tell you that RETAIL drafts 
that were in the process of clearance 'vould be 
honored~ (Emphasis supplied) 
"A. No. 
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• 
'' Q. What did they say·! 
''A. They said drafts now in the process of 
clearance would be honored but they would accept 
no further. dra.f.ts on Mr. Parsle~ 's · account. · 
"Q. They didn ~t differentiate ~tween retail 
and wholesale then~ · 
"A. No sir.'' 
For Appellant to technically describe or label such 
testimony would tbe useless _delineation of the obvious. 
The sixth par~graph of Defendant-Appellant's Ex-
hibit No. 4 remain-s uncontradicted by Responqe.nt in the 
record, although Appellant's Witness W. A. Wilkinson, 
Vice-President of Valley State Bank, denies it. (R. 246, 
line 17 to R. 24 7, line 11) 
Appellant realizes, however, that all things in this 
appeal must be construed in .the light most favorable to 
Respondent._ 
Therefor, assuming that Mr. Wilkinso:q,. told 1\fr. 
Bird at the bank that, all of these· drafts would clear, did 
the Respondent bank. have a right to rely on Wilkinson's 
statement~ 
It is'·submitted it did not, and for these reasons:. 
1. The Bank admits as-suring Mr. Nichols of 
Appellant _Corporation that it would accept no 
further wholesale drafts unles·s authorized ·by 
HIM (Nichols). (Third paragraph Defendant~ 
Appellant's Exhibit No.4). There is no testimony 
or evidence of any kind that Nichols ever re-
manded -said in~tructions. He didn't. 
2. Mr. Bird, Respondent's Vice,.. President, 
was alone with Wilkinson when he claims Wil-
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kinson said the drafts would be paid (R. 200, 
from line 27). Mr. Bird ·did not even know who 
Mr. Wilkinson was (R. 176, line 9 to R. 177, line 
'21), -and neither -did the Bank's C·ashier, Mr. 
Calder (R. 3, lines 16 .to 18). 
Mr. Bird testified th~t the Bank ·could have pre-
vented its loss up till. 6:30p.m. on January 7th, 1953, the 
day of the Bird-Wilkinson con~ersation by refusing to 
pay checks drawn by Parsley, but that it d.idn 't do so 
_because of reliance on Wilkinson (R. 206, lines 10 to 30). 
Here agains-what inherent incredibility, or more 
aptly ch~racterized, in view of Appellant's being ~saddled 
with the ''most favorable light on respondent,'' what 
naivete, coming from a Banker ·with twenty-five some 
odd ye-ars experience. 
About $30,000.00 at stake, and Respondent claims a 
right to reliance on a s.tatement made by 'aD employee 
of Appellant whos~ position was unknown to Respondent. 
F'g.rther' if .such 'Statement was made, which is denied, 
and if the Bank had a right to rely on it, which is ridicul-
ous, the agre~ment to pay said drafts must have been in 
writing tinder the positive provisions of Title 25, Chapter 
.5, Section 4 (2) 1953 Utah Code Annotated. 
Resp_ondent m-~y claim an estopple-, but such precept 
has no application because of lack of a_ right of reliance 
as is hereinabove discussed. 
As a matter of: fact, it is submitted as elemental 
that the B·ank ·should nave taken every step to protect 
itself -and to double ch.eck these transactions because of 
the ''whole sad state of affairs" that had already de-
veloped. All within the knowledge of the Bank. 
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Respondent had :a positive duty, aside from the 
dictates of ·ordinary sense, to stop everything and ''take 
a good long look,'' to quote the language of Appellant's 
Mr. McElhany, (R. 262). 
What would it be supposed that any reasonable·-man 
should do, much less an expirenced banker, if a car 
dealer wrote some $23,000.00 worth of bouncing checks 
to its. financing company, and yet was drawing on said 
finance .company for about $30,000.00~ (R. 265, l~nes 17 
to 23 ; R. 246 ; R. 235, 236, 237, 238). 
The reas:onable man would have :stopped all tran-
actions. Particularly if he were involved. 
But Respondent attempts to tell 'the courts, sue-
ces·sfully below, that Respondent did everything rig)lt. 
It followed instructions and protected itself and Appel-
lant, and its loss was occasioned by Appellant, whose whole 
story of the proceedings was rejected, yet no contradic-
tions can be found iJ.?- Ap·pellant 's testimony. 
~fore to the point for justifiable outrage-judgment 
was rendered for Respondent on the testimoll:y of Calder, 
principally, whose testimony is a study in expediency, 
deceit, and conflict. 
. . ' 
POINT V. 
RESPONDENT NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER EOR 
CHECKS PAID UNDER MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIO-N OF SUF-
FICIENT FUNDS: 
The Respondent in this· action m'akes much ''to-do'' 
over Appellant's having received some of the funds that 
the Bank paid.- out on the subject ~ight drafts. 
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Appellant does not deny that the bank honored s·ome 
checks drawn to its favor by Parsley, and that the 
source of payment for said checks was the -credit allowed 
-~arsley on subjoot ·sight drafts. 
However, to this point it is abundantly cl~ar··that: 
1. Appellant was unacquainted with· .the. 
shabby financial condition of Parsley. 
2. That the. Bank d~sregarded instructions as 
to acceptance of wholesale drafts. 
3. That the bank knew that for each sight 
draft it honored, ~there was a cheek enclosed from 
Parsley to Appellant for most of the amount of 
each 'Sight draft (examination of· the contents of 
each sight draft in this action reveals that), and 
that ·.as drafts were honored by the hank, there 
would shortly come through for payment the check 
enclosed by Parsley to A·p~ellant's order. 
It 1s clear that each of the checks made . -out to 
Appellant by Parsley that 'vere honored. by the b.~nk 
'vere enclosed in draft envelo-pes representing funds 
credi.ted before December 24th, 1952. 
Clearly, the· bank paid these checks on the mistaken 
assumption that their depositor, Parsley, had sufficient 
funds· to handle them. They """ere wrong because the 
source of fhnds they_ had ·counted on was dried up because-
of the Bank's breac·h of agreement in handling ''whole-
sale'' drafts as cash. 
It is elemental that a Bank that mistakenly makes 
payment on a check, thinking funds- are sufficient, has 
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no recourse against the payee but must recover, if at all, 
against the drawe-r of the check. · 
5 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 
1552, provides : 
''If a bank pays a draft ·or a check on the 
mistaken assumption that the drawer has suf-
ficent funds to his credit to 1neet the instrument, 
no recovery ·can he had if this assumption turns 
out to be an error.-'' 
In Michie, ·Banks and Banking, Section 142, thi~ 
language appears: 
'~In the absence of fraud on the part of the 
holder-the payment of a check by a bank is re-
garded as a finality, and the fact that the drawer 
ha;s not funds on deposit will not give the ~bank 
any remedy agains-t the holder. A mistake in 
regard to the amount of the customer's deposit is 
not such a mistake of fact as -entitles a_ hank p:ay-
ing a check to recover back the amount from the 
payee. BANKS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE IN= 
FORMED OF A DEPOSITOR'S FINANCIAL 
STANDING and to know the condition of his 
account with them at the time of presentation 
of checks for payment. THEY ARE REQUIRED, 
AND FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY, ARE COM .. 
PELL-ED TO KNOW AT ALL TIMES THE 
BALANCE OF THE CREDIT OF EACH INDI-
VIDUAL CUSTOMER, and they accept and pay 
checks at their own risk and pe-ril. If from negli-
gence· or inattention to their ·own affairs- banks 
impr·ovidently pay when the account of a customeT 
is not in a ·condition .to warrant it, ... the bank 
must look to the customer for rectification, and 
not to the party to whom the check was paid.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
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Supr-a: . 5 Mitchie, Banks -an~ Banking, Permanent 
Edition, Sec .. 229.; American Law Institute, R-estatement 
of the Law of Restitution, Sec. 33; First National Ba;nk 
~s .. Bu:rkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 ;: Hayes vs. Tootle-Lacy Bank, 
72 F.: 2nd ~29 ·'(lOth· CCA) ; Secur~ty National Bank of 
Sioux _City vs. Ol~ NatiotULl B01nk, 241 F. 1, 1 (8 .CCA); 
Oregon. Iron· and $teel vs. Kelso State Ban]f,, 224 P. 569 
(Wash.); Fi.rst National Bank of Port~ vs . . Noble_, 
168 P. 2n.4 354 (Oreg.);· 7 Am. Jur. 443; ·9 C.J.S. 722; 2 
·Morse Banks and B·anking, 6th ·Ed. 1001; 7 Zollman, 
:·Banks and ~anking, :Perm. Ed. 445. 
The above represents the universal rule with respec-t 
to ~anking pr~ctice·. There are no exeeption:s ·to it. · 
Of .course Respondent claimed fraud in its pleading, 
but such contention was readily rejected by the trial 
court, -and it is submitted that .a full and thorough exami-
nation of_ the_,trial record would not give ,sufficient cred-
ence tQ any ·such claim to. even permit, IN GOOD TASTE, 
an allegation thereof .. · 
A look at Defen~ant-Appellant's Exhibit No. 2 will 
reveal to the Court .the e?Cact daily state of the Bank 
account of Par~ley---->-:overdrafts of th:ousands of ,dollars. 
The bank )vas and is chargea·ble with that knowledge. 
T.he bank knew that the· principal source of funds 
in Parsley's account w:;ts from Appellant's payment of 
sig)l.t' drafts dta\vn on it. 
The bank knew that in each sight draft there- was .. a 
:check for most of the amount of the draft, payable to 
Appellant. 
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The bank knew t~-at Appellant would deposit these 
cheeks and expect to get paid. 
Now then, Appellant gets paid on so:me of the checks 
enclosed in sight drafts already paid by App:ellant and 
Respondent cries fraud. 
One step further; though Respondent makes claim to 
re~imbursement for monies paid to Appellant on the 
~becks mentioned, nowhere is an exact amount claimed 
or pleaded 
It appears that the Respondent merely bases its 
claim, in this regard, to recovery because Appellant 
received ''some money.'' But Appellant also lost money 
-some $70,00.00. 
True, Respondent in its brief will come up· with a 
total amount, and with exhibits of checks honored which 
were only produced after Calder's aborted attempt to 
testify as to "truth" and "knowledge" from photostatic 
coptes. 
In any event, Respondent's claim to restitution under 
the theory berein discussed is untenable. 
POINT VI. 
IF THERE WAS A DEBT DUE FROM APPELLANT TO 
RESPONDENT, IT WAS PAID AND DISCHARGED UPON 
EXECU'riON OF THE PARSLEY MORTGAGE TO RE-
SPONDENT: 
For the purposes of this argument, let's assume that 
there was a joint and several obligation from Appellant 
and Parsley to Respondent. 
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On January 12, 1953; the ·debt thus due to Re-
spondent was not then liquidated, for 'the reason that an 
exa-ct computation of the claimed debt was not made 
until a filing of the Cilmplaint by Respondent. 
Refer to Defendant-A-ppellant's Exhibit No.4 where 
·Respondent claims a n~t -deficiency of $20,981.33, and then 
refer to the amount asked in its Complaint, which is 
$21,431.08. 
lt is clear, therefor; that on January 12th, 1953, there 
was an unliquidated joint and several obligation. 
On January 12th, Respondent took a note and chattel 
1n.ortgage from Parsley to itself to secure the sum of 
$21,000.00, a liquidated and compromised amount, for 
valuable consideration. · 
Cross Examination, C.alder; R. 102: 
"Q. Now the reason Mr. Parsley wanted you 
to return the drafts was because they were retail 
i terns, isn 't that correct~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. That is the conversation you had with 
him and you ;did teturn them bec:ause'they were 
retail items-~ 
"A. We returned them because he said they 
had a value .to him and he could realize the value 
from them by -either selling them to the Universal 
C.I. T ~ or ·disposing -of them. '' 
Direct Examination, Ca.lfZfl~"--, R. 22: 
'' Q. Do you know the reason why 'Mr. Pars-
ley wanted the drafts returned to him~ 
''A. Yes. He insisted on them for considera-
tion of signing a-note and mor.tgage ·which the 
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ibank took at the time to protect it against loss 
on these dishonored -drafts. 
'' Q. So that in eonsidera tion for 'the return 
of ,these drafts he gave you a note and mortgage 
on his property 1 
''A. He gave us a note and mortgage ... '' 
l~ is clear beyond equivocation that Respondent 
thereby converted an unliquidated, unsecured debt into 
a liquidated, secured debt, for value. 
It is respectfully submitted that the bank took said 
note and mortgage as PAYMENT IN FULL of the obli-
gation that arose to it. 
To justify a conclusion of payment in full: 
1. The hank. filed, under oath, its claim as a 
secured creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings in 
Federal Court, claiming its debt good and not a 
preference, and was given for value. (See plead-
_ings). The bank still has that ·claim and claims 
full validity. 
2.. The bank took the note and mortgage 
secretly, and refused to release it, and collected 
money thereon : 
Calder, Cross Examination: 
'' Q. Now, calling your attention to on or 
about the 13th day of January, 1953, do you recall 
being pre'Sent at a conversation with Mr. McEl-
hany and myself and other officers of your bank 
wherein we discussed the position of Harry Pars-
ley, Inc.~ 
"A. Yes sir . 
. "Q. Was it at that Ineeting, Mr. Calder, that 
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it was agreed you· and Mr. Nichols would supervise 
thre operation of the business! 
''A. My recollection is . . . yes sir. 
'' Q. And as a consequence of that meeting, 
isn't it true that these used cars you testified to, 
that Universial C.I.T. would return to Mr. P:ars-
ley's lot! 
''A. I understand they were returned. 
' ' Q. All returned T 
' 'A. All returned. Ye-s. 
"Q~ At that time you didn't mention that 
your company ·had taken a mortgage on all the 
property the day before, did you T 
''A. Well ... 
'' Q. Well, just answer . . .. T 
"A. January 20th, that was when it was first 
mentioned." (R. 102-103). 
"· 
"* 
"Q. Calling your attention to January 20, 
1953, on that .partieular date there was a meeting 
in. the board room at your bank iat which myself 
and John Rampton, Attorney for the State Tax 
Commission, Mr. Parsley, Mr. McElhany, Mr. 
Sperry, your-self, Mr. Hedquist (President of the 
bank), and Mr. Bird were all pre·sent. Is that 
!true! 
''A. That is true. 
''Q~ The substanc~ of that conference was 
that: things were not going well in managing 
Harry Parsley's ·business, pursuant to the agree-
ment 've made on January 13th. Is that right 1 
''A. Yes. 
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"Q. It was at that meeting that your 
attorney, J. Rulon Morgan, first informed all con-
cerned parties of this chattel mortgage and note 
that was taken from Mr. Parsley by your company 
on J:anuary 12th~ '· 
''A.. That is right 
"Q. Now, do you recall my having asked you 
and other officers of the bank to relinquish that 
mortgage~ 
' 'A. Yes 'Sir 0 
"Q. And what was your answer~ 
' 'A. . Q .. I recall the reply came from Mr .. 
Morgan. 
"Q. And what did he say~ 
''A. He said under no circumstances would 
we release the chattel ( R. 118-119)., 
,, * 
" * 
" * 
'' Q. Mr. Calder, in connection with the 
assignment of accounts receivable to the bank, 
how much have you collected of those accountis 
.... to date, do you remember 1 
''A. . .. It is in the neighborhood of $2,400.00 
(R. 70). 
3. Respondent did not make claim nor re-
serve claim of any kind against Appellant when 
it took said note and mortgage: 
Calder, Cross-Examination: 
'' Q. On the date the mortgage and note were 
executed, Mr. ·Calder, no reservation of rights or 
claims against Universal C.I.T. were made in 
writing by you, were there~ 
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"A. In the instrument -itself 1 
"Q .. y . es s1-r. 
"A. No. 
'' Q. Or by any other instrument~ 
"A. N . o. sir. 
''Q. Or by -any other document~ 
"A. No sir. 
''Q. No demand w·as made on Universal 
C~I.T. at :any time for the payment of this~ 
''A. Subsequent to this~ 
"Q. During January 12th and 13th, is that 
true~ 
''A. No, there had not been. Subsequent to 
that there has been, though." (R. 103-104)c 
Title 15, Chapter 4, 1953 Utah _Code Annotated con-
tains the provisions relating to discharge of co-obligors. 
15-4-3 provides : 
"PAYMENT BY CO-OBLIGOR - The 
amount or value of ·any consideration received by 
the obligee from one or more of joint or of joint 
and several obligors, in whole or in partial satis-
faction· of their obligations shall be credited to the 
extent· of the amount received on the obligation 
of all coobligors to whom the obligor or obligors 
giving the consideration did not stand in the rela-
tion nf a surety. ' ' 
Itis submitted that the above section controls in this 
matter: 
1. There was a co-obligation, for purposes of 
this argument, from Appellant and Parsley to Re-
spondent. 
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2.. The Respondent, for value, received the 
note and mortgage from Parsley for $21,000.00, in 
full payment 
3. Appellant was not a surety of Parsley. 
Respondent, of course, will strongly argue that it 
did not accept the note and mortgage as payment. 
Appellant urges thi·s court, however, that the facts 
adduced at the trial show beyond doubt that the bank's 
intent "\Vas to accept said new obligation as payment in 
full. 
They secretly took the mortgage. 
They tenaciously hung on to it. 
They collected money on it. 
They did and do now claim it to be wholly valid 
and in full force and effect in every'aspect (under oath 
1n the Federal District Court). 
It is submitted that Respondent had and has no 
right to "cross its fingers." 
The. result of the trial court's judgment is a com-
pelling of Appellant to become an unwilling ~assignee 
of Respondent's mortgage in the 'bankruptcy proceed-
ings-though the court in its findings and judgment 
made no mention that Appellant would be entitled to 
Respondent's share of any proceeds upon distribution 
in bankruptcy. 
The hank, by acceptance and retention of the note 
and mortgage caused an extinguishment of any rights 
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whatever that it may have had as a result of the pre-
vious transactions. 
POINT VII. 
THAT RESPONDENT, BY TAKING A NOTE AND 
MORTGAGE, IRREVOCABLY ELECTED ITS SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHT FOR ENFORCEMENT. 
In order that Appellant's position in this section 
will be cle:ar, conceding again for argument th·at an 
obligation to Respondent was in existence, there must 
be -clear deline·ation between election of remedies and 
election of substantive rights. 
At 18 Am. Jur., 131, this language appears: 
"Often, what is spoken -of in judicial opin-
ions as a choice between remedies is in reality 
a choice of ~alternative substantive rights. The 
distinction is not one infrequently obscured, and 
yet it is important that it be heeded. An elec-
tion between substantive rights g-oes, not to the 
form, but to the substance, affecting some right 
selected. . . . The ·doctrine of election of reme-
dies applies in order to protect one from vexa-
tious litigation, while the rule as to election of 
suibstantive rights has to do with the !actual 
status of some property or c9ntrnctual rights. 
That is to s-ay, ·a person having the option to fix 
definitely ·a property or contractual right with-
out reference to the consent or wishes of the 
oth~r party to the transaction is bound by the 
exercise of his option. '' 
It is Appellant's claim that the bank, 'by. taking the 
note and mortga.ge, and keeping it over the objection 
of Appellant, and collecting money on it, and claiming it 
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valid under oath in bankruptcy proceedings, thereby is 
pre-cluded from asserting any claims ·against Appell'ant 
whatever. Respondent has made a positive election of 
its substantive right. It thus waived any substantive 
right it may have had against Appellant. 
Respondent, if it is to recoup any part of its loss, 
must pursue the course it chose for itself-collect on the 
basis of its rights as a secured creditor in the bankruptcy 
proceedings ag·ainst Parsley, Inc. 
Appellant should not be compelled to stand in the 
shoes of the bank ·and defend the 1bank's position. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony produced ~at the trial will not, in the 
minds of reas·ona;ble men, substantiate the novel finding 
that it is possible to detect a wholesale trans·action by 
looking at the face of a sight draft. 
The testimony, to the minds of all reasonable men, 
will neither support ~a finding that Appellant's employees 
made statements promising· payment or that Respond-
ent's employees had any right of reliance even if they 
'vere made. 
The Respondent chose its substantive right for 
enforcement, and judgment should he directed in favor 
of Appellant and against Respondent, no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL· 
Attorney for Appellant. 
'/ 
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